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This paper analyses the price of a common basket of products sold in each of the UK’s four 
largest retail chains to assess propositions regarding price leadership. Data used in this 
investigation represent weighted average prices of a large group of branded and non-
branded products purchased nationally at weekly intervals over a three and half year 
period and cover purchases in 37 product categories.  The data are analysed using vector 
autoregressive methods, a convenient framework for a statistical investigation of this sort, 
owing to the time series properties that the price data exhibit. The paper introduces the 
concepts of strategic and tactical price leadership. Since these correspond to parameter 
restrictions in the vector autoregression, the statistical tests have a economically 
meaningful interpretation. While the empirical findings are preliminary, they indicate that 
Tesco, the largest of the retail chains, acts as price leader in both the strategic and tactical 
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I.   Introduction 
Competition among national food retail chains has emerged as a focal issue in public policy 
in recent years. In the UK this has been highlighted by the on-going statutory inquiry - the 
second in seven years -  in to the conduct of grocery multiples by the UK’s foremost anti-
trust authority, the Competition Commission (Competition Commission 2007). A 
persistent theme in the Competition Commission’s scrutiny of supermarket behaviour 
over this period has been retail price competition, and it is to this aspect of the public 
policy debate that the current paper seeks to contribute, albeit with methods and results 
that are of a preliminary nature. The paper evaluates propositions relating to the existence 
and form of price leadership among the UK’s four largest grocery multiple retail chains 
using data relating to October 1999 to October 2002. While the industry maintains its 
pricing reflects unbridled competition within the sector, the recent agreement by the 
supermarkets to pay fines amounting to £116 million for their involvement in collusion  
on pricing of milk and dairy products during 2002 and 2003 casts some doubt over this 
(Office of Fair Trading, 2007).
1  
 
Being one of the most highly concentrated grocery markets in the world, the UK offers an 
ideal opportunity to examine the issue of price leadership: the largest four firms currently 
account for 76% of the grocery market, with the largest retailer, Tesco, having twice the 
market share of its nearest competitor and accounting for almost one in every three 
pounds spent on groceries in the UK (TNS Worldpanel, 2007). It should be noted however 
that during the period which price behaviour is formally analysed in this paper market 
shares of the so-called ‘Big four’ supermarkets, namely Tesco, Sainsbury ASDA and 
Safeway were 24.6%, 20.7%13.4% and 12.5% respectively  (see Rickard 2006 p.260). 
 
Supermarkets themselves readily acknowledge that prices set by their competitors 
represent the principal driver in their own pricing (Competition Commission 2000, 
pp.135).  Whether a firm operates a policy whose aim is to offer persistently low prices on 
a wide range of products (the so called Every-Day-Low-Price, EDLP policy) or the more 
traditional policy reliant on deep discounts on a relatively narrow range of core products 
(‘Hi-Lo’ pricing) all major retailers routinely undertake detailed monitoring of competitor 
pricing, either via covert price collection or through market research companies who 
provide and process Electronic Point of Sale (EPOS) data on their behalf. Price surveys are 
typically conducted on a weekly basis and in some cases cover the entire products range, 
although more commonly they are confined to between 1,000 and 4,000 product lines (see 
Competition Commission 2000, Appendix 7.1).   
 
For obvious reasons, competitor price monitoring is an essential ingredient of any price 
matching exercise, and as in other highly concentrated industries, price-matching 
guarantees form a key component in marketing strategy in UK food retailing. Recent 
examples include the “Good Food Costs Less at Sainsbury's” campaign , described by BBC 
news as “probably the best known advertisement in retailing” and the Tesco “Price Check” 
in its “Every Little Helps” campaign, whereby prices of up to 10,000 products are 
compared in the major retail chains. Most notably however was the “That’s ASDA Price” 
campaign in which the retailer claimed to be the UK’s ‘Lowest Priced Supermarket’, a 
claim that they were subsequently forced retract by the Advertising Standards Agency 
(Advertising Standards Authority 2005) following a complaint by Tesco. ASDA have 
                                                 
1 Following an investigation in to the sharing of commercially sensitive information among ASDA, Tesco 
Sainsbury and Morrisons and Safeway  and dairy processors during 2002 and 2003 all but Tesco has admittedly 
involvement in anti-competitive practices and agreed to paid fines of £116 million. Tesco’s involvement is still 
the subject of the on-going investigation. See Office of Fair Trading 2007 for details.  2  
however been winner of the Grocer Magazine ‘lowest priced supermarket’ for the past 10 
years, an accolade which it uses widely when promoting the ASDA brand. Clearly, the 
label ‘price leader’ confers benefit to the retailer: not only does it add value to its overall 
brand image in mind of the price-conscious consumer but it serves to evidence the 
relentless competition that the supermarkets claim to face.  
 
Price leadership is not by necesstity pro-competitive of course. Indeed, while barometric 
price leadership may  directly reflect the benign pricing of a market leader responding 
more quickly than its rivals to changing cost and demand conditions, the practice is more 
commonly ascribed to the presence of anti-competitive behaviour. Two models 
characterise the literature, (a) dominant firm and (b) collusive price leadership (see for 
example, Rickard 2006; Schrefer 1990).   In the former, the distribution of firm size is 
highly skewed such that one firm dominates an otherwise competitive fringe. The 
dominant firm sets its own price based upon the market demand not served by the fringe - 
its residual demand - and by using its market power charges above marginal cost. At this 
market price economic rents accrue to the leader and at least some of the firms in the 
competitive fringe, encouraging investment in additional capacity by the fringe and/or 
new entrants, which unless the dominant firm can prevent, via entry barriers or other 
deterrents will drive prices and the dominant firm’s market share down. One option is 
tacit collusion with the competitive fringe and given its position of dominance, 
punishment of smaller rivals deviating from the set price may be a credible threat, even in 
the longer term. Nevertheless, where firms are more or less equally-sized selling to at least 
some degree differentiated products the dominant firm model of price leadership may be 
inappropriate.  
 
As with the tacit collusion in the dominant firm case, collusive price leadership 
(Rotemberg and Saloner, 1990) is an inherently dynamic model of oligopolistic 
competition in which price announcements by one firm are quickly matched by rivals. 
While each firm will typically profit more as a price leader, whether it becomes price 
leader is dependent upon the balance between cost and demand conditions for the 
(differentiated) products it sells relative to others in the industry. The decision to lead is 
also based upon relative informational advantage, so that it may pay some firms to follow 
where another firm is better informed about the market. More generally, firms may decide 
to follow a leader’s price change if they consider the one-off gains to deviating from the 
price matching policy less than the losses they would incur if the leader retaliated by 
reversion to a non-cooperative  strategy (i.e. a persistent price war). Such a price leader-
follower model may be  dynamically sustainable if the threat of non-cooperative behaviour 
is credible. In the model, the price leader also has a strategic calculation of its own to 
perform. Whereas changing price in response to changes in relative demand and cost 
conditions induces one-off gains at the expense of the follower(s) these need to the traded-
off against the likelihood that rival firms revert to non-cooperative behaviour themselves.  
 
Tacit collusion is not confined to conduct over time but may result where firms compete 
in several markets, so that because of the threat of retaliation in one market, a firm may 
mollify it pricing behaviour in another (see Bernheim and Winston 1990).  In essence, 
whether the fruits of tacit collusion be brokered over time or across markets, the 
sustainability of price leadership in these models critically depends upon the credibility of 
threat enforcement in the event that firms deviate from the tacitly agreed norms. Tactics 
that signal behaviour to rivals or commit a firm to predetermined actions are likely to 
bolster the sort of tacit collusion essential in price leadership and it is in this light that the 
price matching guarantees, so commonly observed in supermarket campaigns, that gives 
cause for concern. According to this line of reasoning (see Logan and Lutter 1989; Zhang  3  
1995) price matching, particularly as part of national advertising campaigns, are effective 
signaling devices, not only to customers but rivals too. Price guarantees thus serve a dual 
purpose in the market, informing competitors of the likely response in the event of price 
undercutting, as well as signposting its pro-competitive credentials to potential customers.  
It is in this way that price matching may actually stifle competition as part of a strategy of 
tacit collusion, and in so doing lead to prices remaining more stable and at a higher level 
than would have prevailed in the full heat of open competition.  Two facets of price 
matching are also of relevance here. First, the guarantees typically apply to a limited range 
of products, allowing the retailer to recoup margins on background lines excluded from the 
promotion. Second, in markets best described as saturated, in which total demand for food 
in price inelastic, market share can only be won at the expense of rivals and thus strategies 
that deter price competition, and foster stability even if unintentionally so, are likely to be 
highly attractive. In their evaluation of price matching in regional grocery markets in the 
US Hess and Gerstner (1991) found evidence to suggest that price competition was weaker 
in the presence of price matching, in that the low cost supermarkets would allow prices of 
price-matched products to rise more than those excluded from the policy. 
 
One other aspect of supermarket retailing is also of relevance to the issue of price 
leadership. Major UK retailers all rely on price promotions (albeit to varying degrees) as an 
integral part of their marketing strategy. Evidence submitted to the Competition 
Commission’s first supermarket inquiry, revealed the extent of discounting in the grocery 
marketeer’s armory. With the exception of ASDA, the large multiples offered between 
500-1,500 promotional offers at any one time, sales of which could represent up to 30% of 
total sales, from 20,000 or more product lines (Competition Commission 2000, p.117).
2 
Even ASDA, the most notable EDLP mainstream retailer, would typically promote 
around 50 products per week at an average discount of 35% (Competition Commission 
2000, p.80). Furthermore, the companies stated that the common practice was not to 
respond to price promotions in rivals owing to the time it takes for stocks to be amassed 
on promoted products. In this light it is clear why rivals might use discounting on the scale 
that they evidently do – they represent the only means for a retailer to obtain a price 
advantage that they are confident will not be matched by rivals. While promotional 
discounts are temporary, rarely lasting more than four weeks, providing they are rotated 
around the products in-store (and given large number of lines relative to those being 
promoted this is always feasible) retaliation by rivals is unlikely to be provoked. 
Promotions thus represent an acceptable means of competition and allow rivals to credibly 
offer seemingly pro-competitive price-matching guarantees without being seen as breaking 
rank from the pricing norm. Price leadership may be one way of signaling what the norm 
actually is. Seen in this light, promotions, price matching and price leadership are elements 
of imperfect competition that thrive on the oxygen of tacit collusion. 
 
In sum, market conditions and common practices that prevail in the UK grocery sector 
suggest the possibility of price leadership in at least one of the three commonly 
acknowledged forms. While barometric price leadership is to all intents and purposes 
benign and would tend to result in the competitive outcome, it reflects changes in 
company costs. While these are not available outside the realms of a statutory inquiry, the 
Competition Commission could not find sufficient evidence to support such barometric 
leadership in their 2000 Inquiry (see below). As a result, where price leadership is detected, 
                                                 
2 Average sales uplift on promoted products is typically 200% , although increases of 3,000% were reported for 
the most popular BOGOF-type offers. As a result, promotions are planned well in advance as part of a 
coordinated marketing strategy to ensure supplies are available in-store to meet antipated demand. See 
Competition Commission 2000, p.117.)  4  
it is likely to be indicative of imperfect competition. Prices set by a dominant or collusive 
price leader tend to be above the competitive level and it is for this reason that it attracts 
the attention of anti-trust authorities. So while the practice of price leadership is entirely 
consistent with the actions of a low-cost firm wishing to advertise this advantage over its 
rivals, even in highly concentrated sectors, its presence is evidential of imperfect 
competition although nothing more. 
 
Against this background, this paper presents preliminary results of an econometric 
framework indicate the presence of a price leader in the UK during the sample frame. 
Before the results are provided, a short review of the price leadership investigation 
published in Competition Commissions 2000 report is given, this being the only similar 
exercise published relating to the UK grocery sector. In Section III the data is presented 
and following an brief explanation of the empirical methodology in section IV, results are 
presented in Section V. The paper then concludes.  
  
 
II.   The Competition Commission (2000) Price Leadership Analysis   
As part of their statutory inquiry in to multiple food retailers published in 2000, the 
Competition Commission investigated the issue of price leadership in some detail. The 
Commission considered econometric evidence supplied by Sainsbury and Tesco and in 
addition, undertook a detailed descriptive and statistical analysis of their own. The 
Competition Commission study analysed relationships between the weekly (promotion-
inclusive) prices of 18 specific products sold by five mainstream retailers (ASDA, Morrison, 
Safeway, Sainsbury and Tesco) and one discounter (Aldi). The products included fresh and 
ambient goods in branded and own-label forms over a three year period spanning 
September 1996 to September 1999. 
3 The analysis was designed to detect any systematic 
pattern in the timing of price changes, most notably price leadership,  ‘. . . where one or 
two multiples consistently act as leaders for price changes with other multiples following’ 
(Competition Commission 2000, p.135). Graphical inspection of the data on a product-by-
product basis suggested that Tesco and ASDA were potential price leaders; price changes 
originating in Sainsbury and Safeway being unusual.  The Commission noted that 
Morrison’s prices changed little over the period and Aldi prices were largely independent 
of those offered by the other retailers.  
 
Informed by this graphical evidence, the Commission performed regression analysis, 
confining their investigation to the prices in the ‘Big Four’ supermarkets, namely ASDA, 
Safeway, Sainsbury and Tesco.  Using single equation methods, the price change of a 
product in one supermarket was regressed on a constant and the lagged price change of the 
same product in a rival, for all (6×2=12) pairwise permutations of rivals and applied to 
each of the 18 products.  Using the statistical significance of the lagged price coefficient at 
the 5% level as its evidential criterion, the Commission detected price leadership in 6 of the 
18 products, with Tesco and ASDA found to price lead in roughly equal measure, 
corroborating the indications from visual inspection of the prices themselves.  
 
The Commission then considered the responses of Sainsbury and Tesco, who were critical 
of the empirical approach that had been adopted on methodological and statistical grounds.  
They pointed to the bivariate nature of the regression models and the presence of 
                                                 
3  For example, bread (800g white medium sliced own brand loaf); semi-skimmed milk (4 pint plastic own 
brand bottle);  Wall’s sausages (1lb pack, thick, fresh) Kellog’s Cornflakes (750 g box); baked beans (own-
label economy 400g tin) and Andrex kitchen towels (white, quilted three-pack). For the complete details see 
Table 1 Appendix 7.10, p.143 of Competition Commission (2000).  5  
autocorrelated residuals in many of the price equations, short-comings which the 
Commission duly acknowledged in their report (Competition Commission 2000, p.149). 
These companies undertook extensive econometric analyses of their own but the 
alternative frameworks adopted were themselves criticized by the Commission. 
Specifically, Sainsbury’s modelling had ignored the time series properties (i.e. non-
stationarity) of the price data used; Tesco’s definition of leadership appeared unduly 
restrictive
4 and both used a single equation framework for the estimation of price 
relationships.    
 
Sainsbury estimated price leadership regressions using price levels of 20 products in three 
supermarkets. In contrast, Tesco used the price changes of 840 products in seven 
supermarkets, estimating price equations for individual products and in aggregate using 
pooled data, for both pairwise regressions and en masse using seven retailers.  
 
Although neither exercise detected a price leader, the results reported by the two 
companies offered contradictory views of price leadership in the market. Whereas 
Sainsbury could find no evidence of price leadership in the 20 products it had selected, 
Tesco found that leadership was a relatively common feature among the 840 products it 
had analysed but because no systematic pattern of leadership/followership could be 
discerned among the seven retailers, Tesco concluded with Sainsbury that no retailer acted 
as price leader in the UK market.  Given the differences in coverage and approach adopted 
the Commission did not attempt to reconcile the findings that the two companies 
presented preferring simply to note, ‘These exercises were intended to show that there was 
no consistent pattern in price leadership or following across a broad range of products.” 
Competition Commission 2000, p.138). 
 
Retailers were also required to supply data on the costs of the 18 products to allow the 
Commission to assess whether the leadership it had detected was barometric in nature and 
thus reflected changes in costs of the market leaders. Using graphical and regression-based 
methods the Commission found generally weak correlations between costs and prices, the 
latter being dominated by promotions, partly funded by suppliers. In some cases, cost 
changes were clearly not passed on to retail prices and the use of over-riders, the 
repositioning of margins and persistent below-cost selling on core lines acted to blur the 
price:cost relationships in the products investigated. As a result the Commission did not 
find sufficient evidence to support barometric price leadership. The analysis did however 
lend weight to the message conveyed by many of the retailers in the course of the Inquiry 
that the principal driver behind price changes was the behaviour of competitors, 
particularly on certain core lines (the so called, ‘known value items’) (Competition 
Commission 2000 p.142).  
 
In sum the Commission concluded that there was no clear price leader with in the 
industry, despite finding evidence of leadership in one-third of the products tested. Indeed, 
while the product-specific analysis facilitated detailed scrutiny of the timing of price 
changes they were only too aware that such specificity could only at best offer a partial 
view of the pricing of the 20,000 or more products typically available in the mainstream 
retailers. Of key concern was that intense competition may be concentrated in a very 
selective range of products (to the detriment of competition on the products more 
generally) and that it was in the interests of each retailer to maintain the status quo; to do 
                                                 
4  In one set of models estimated by Tesco price leadership required the retailer to be the leader for at least four 
(from a list of six) other retailers and not being led by any of the retailers. Using this criterion, Tesco found 
evidence of leadership in 1.6 per cent of the 840 products considered.   6  
otherwise may trigger a price war that would be in none of the supermarket’s interests. In 
this respect a more broadly defined price index common to all supermarkets would have 
served as a useful complement to their product specific analysis, however none such series 
were available to them. However, data of this sort is what is analysed in Section V, details 
of which we now present.   
 
III.    Data 
The adoption of electronic Point of Sale (EPOS) systems in UK supermarkets during the 
1990s has meant that details of virtually every transaction conducted in multiple food 
retailers are now automatically recorded.  By using a laser-read barcode or similar 
electronic identifier as products pass through the check-out, EPOS systems allow for a 
fully comprehensive and detailed record of all purchases. EPOS data include transactions in 
all stores (irrespective of format) owned by a retailer and take account of explicit price 
discounts (10% off), quantity discounts (buy-one-get-one-free) as well as loyalty card 
discounting. As such they offer an unparalleled (albeit privately owned) quantitative 
resource, unaffected by the sampling variability or the limited coverage of survey data.   
 
The data used in this investigation derives from the EPOS data tapes that are held by 
Information Resources International (IRI), a leading market research agency. The data 
archive relate to the sales of  the top UK supermarket chains, the so called, ‘Big Four’ 
(which, during the sample frame were Tesco, Sainsbury, ASDA and Safeway). IRI 
constructed price indices of a common basket of products sold in each of these retailers for 
195 weeks over a three year and eight month period (January 1999 to October 2002 
inclusive). The series, depicted in Figure 1, represent comparable national prices indices of 
an “all goods” basket of products for the most significant UK supermarket retailers and 




Key features of the data construction are set out below.
6  In order to provide a basis for 
comparison across retailers, the price indices are based on a common basket of products. 
The basket covers 36 major product categories that include fresh, chilled and frozen foods, 
in raw and processed forms; ambient foods (such as those in tins and packets) as well as a 
wide range of beverages (including soft drinks; caffeine-based products; beers, wines and 
spirits) and non-food items such as medicines, toiletries and pet food, (see appendix for a 
full list).  As such the price series are broadly based and representative of consumer 
supermarket spending in general.
7 The categories are expenditure weighted in the price 
index using weights from UK consumer spending patterns and based upon the actual prices 
of several hundred ‘indicator’ products that are selected using the conventions adopted by 
the Office of National Statistics in compiling the Retail Price Index. 
 
The common basket includes both branded and own-label products, for which there are 
separate requirements for inclusion in the list of indicator products. Specifically, only 
branded products sold in (at least 60% of the stores owned by) each retailer and only those 
                                                 
5 I am indebted to Mr. Neil Thorington and Dr. Peter Cain of Information Resources Incorporated for 
granting access to these data.   
6 Further details are available upon request. 
7 Constructing the series in this way overcomes the selectivity bias noted in the CC(2000) report (p.109) and 
discussed in the previous section. Of course, from the retailers point of view it may be more important to price 
lead on certain product ranges more than other to better reflect the demands of its consumers. Whilst 
acknowledgement is made of nuances in demand across retailers more broadly defined all the retailers in this 
study occupy the middle ground in UK retailing at the time of analysis.  7  
own-label products that can be matched with equivalent products in each of the four 
retailers are eligible for indicator product status. 
 
Figure 1: All-goods Price Indices by Retailer (weekly, January 1999 to October 2002) 









Of the products that meet these (branded and own-label) criteria the top (i.e. highest 
selling) 25 of them in each 37 categories form a shortlist from which indicator products are 
selected in each category. Finally, to allow for the introduction of new products and 
changes in consumer spending patterns over time the product composition of the basket 
and the weights assigned to each category are updated annually on a calendar year basis. 
The resulting price index for each retailer is indexed to 100 in 1999(1), subsequent 
observations denote the price of the common (albeit evolving) basket of goods relative to 
its level at the start date. While this means that comparisons of the absolute value of each 
retailer cannot be made, (i.e. it cannot be inferred from Figure 1 that Tesco is the ‘cheapest’ 
supermarket) the data measure price changes of identical products at high frequency (short 
interval between successive observations) and thus are highly suitable for the detection of 
price leadership at an aggregate level.  
 
Table 1: ADF test statistics 
 
  Levels [lag]  First Differences [lag]  Inference  on 
levels 
ASDA    -2.487   [5]    -5.302**     [4]  I(1) 
Safeway    -3.055   [1]    -10.11**     [1]  I(1) 
Sainsbury    -2.778   [2]    -13.26**     [1]  I(1) 
Tesco    -2.783   [5]    -8.029**   [4]  I(1) 
Levels regressions include a constant and time trend; those for the first difference only a constant. Lag length 
selected by AIC and residual autocorrelation test. Both criteria select the lag length reported in the table. 5% 
(1%) critical values of the ADF statistic are -3.43 (-4.01) for the levels regression and -2.88 (-3.47) for the first 
differences. Starred statistics indicate rejection at the 5% (*) and 1% (**) levels respectively.    8  
Prior to the econometric analysis the data are tested for the order of integration. Results 
from the application of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to the data in levels and first 
differences are reported in Table 1 and confirm that the data are I(1) in levels and thus I(0) 




IV.    Methodology 
To allow for the possibility that the prices are non-stationary and cointegrated, the 
empirical analysis is couched in a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework. This modeling 
approach is empirically tractable and particularly well-suited to an investigation of price 
leadership, whose principal hypotheses boil down to restrictions of certain parameters in 
the estimated model.  The VAR also conveniently accommodates the dynamic interactions 
between the prices as a group (rather than as a series of pairs) in a manner that does not 
impose untested exogeneity assumptions. Owing to the familiarity of the techniques only a 
brief sketch is provided here (see Hendry and Juselius 2001 and Juselius, 2006 for further 
details). It is assumed that the price series may be approximated by a VAR(p) model,   
  t t p t p t t t ε Ψ Φ Φ Φ + + + + + = − − − D x x x x   .   .   .   2 2 1 1  (1) 
where   is a ( ) vector of I(1) jointly determined prices,   is a ( ) vector of 
deterministic terms (constant and trend) and each 
t x 1 × k t D 1 × d
i Φ  ( p i , , 1K = ) and  are ( ) and 
( ) matrices of coefficients to be estimated using a (t = 1, . . .T) sample of data.   is a 
( ) vector of n.i.d. disturbances with zero mean and non-diagonal covariance matrix, 
.  Rearranging (1) into its error correction form gives the VECM representation,  
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which is particularly attractive for price leadership inference. Specifically, equation (2) 
decomposes the data in to linear combinations of its levels and first differences, which 
separates any long-run (equilibrium) relationships that exists between the prices from those 
that are purely temporary or short run nature.  This distinction carries over into to 
notions of price leadership. If changes to the level of a Price A are correlated to subsequent 
changes in the levels of Prices B and C, then Price A leads the other prices. In this case 
lagged changes of Price A appear with statistically significant effects in the equations 
describing how changes in B and C behave.  This is the notion of price leadership as 
commonly understood which can be detected empirically by statistical tests on the 
coefficients in the  i Γ  matrices, known as tests of Granger-Causation (Granger, 1969).  A 
price that is Granger-causal for all others but is not Granger-caused by any other satisfies 
the conditions for unidirectional Granger-Causality (see Patterson p.539 for example) and 
denotes price leadership, which I refer to as tactical price leadership, to distinguish it from 
strategic price leadership set out below. As with any Granger-Causality there may be 
mutual (i.e. bi-directional) Granger-causality (in which case, for example, A is a Granger-
cause for B and B is a Granger-cause for A) or no causality. Moreover, wherever there are 
more than two variables a price can be unidirectional Granger-Causal for some but not all 
prices. We define a price to tactically lead the market (rather than all prices within the 
market) if it is Granger Causal for at least one price and not Granger-caused by any others. 
 
While tactical price leadership relates to the short run dynamics between prices, as 
equation (2) makes clear, where there exists cointegration between the prices ( 0 ≠ β ), then 
a price may also lead others in terms of the long term evolution of prices. Such behaviour 
is described as strategic price leadership can be detected by the application of significance  9  
tests to the error correction coefficients that comprise the loading vector (α ) using 
standard tests of (long run) weak exogeneity. Intuitively, a variable that does not adjust to 
restore the equilibrium of which it is part, is exogenous to that relationship. In this sense it 
drives the other variables in the long run and as such can be thought of as a strategic price 
leader. In general, where a long run relation exists, all elements may be expected to adjust 
so that the equilibrium is restored. Where a price is weakly exogenous to the equilibrium 
of which it is part defines a strategic price leader.  
 
In order for strategic price leadership to exist there must be cointegration among the 
variables hence cointegration testing forms an important part of the empirical analysis. 
Specifically, the VECM given by equation (2) is estimated using Johansens’s (1988) 
maximum likelihood procedure. As there may exist up to  (k - 1) cointegrating relations 
among the k variables in  , we require some means of determining the correct number.  
Here we compute Johansen’s Trace  and Maximal Eigenvalue test statistics (Johansen, 





V.   Results 
To allow for at most linear trend in the price series, the VECM representation of the VAR 
includes an unrestricted constant and a trend that is restricted to the levels
8 Given that the 
data are weekly, five lags are considered to be more than sufficient to capture the dynamics 
among the prices. To determine the optimal lag length, model selection criteria are 
calculated for the VAR(p) model  with p = 5, . . .,1 (see Table 2).  AS can be seen from the 
table, while the SBC and HQC prefer a VAR(1) the AIC is indifferent between a VAR(1) 
and VAR(3). Model reduction tests suggests that second and third lags are significant at the 
5% level, a result supported by the presence of serial correlation in the VAR(2).  As a 
result, the VAR(3) model is selected as the benchmark specification in which subsequent 
testing is conducted.  
 
Given the importance of deterministic terms to the VAR (see Juselius, 2006), we first assess 
whether the constant term can be restricted to the levels of the data. With a probability 
value of 0.61 the restriction is easily upheld and so we now use this model to test for 
cointegration using Johansen’s (1988) reduced rank procedure. Results for the asymptotic 
and finite sample variants of Trace and Maximal Eigenvalue tests are reported in Table 3 
and point to the presence of a single cointegrating relation at conventional levels of 
significance.
9 Variable exclusion tests are also reported in the table and indicate that, unlike 
the prices of ASDA, Tesco and Safeway, the price of Sainsbury does not enter the 
cointegrating relation. While this may reflect the independence of Sainsbury prices from 
the long term evolution of prices, this result is at odds with the data in Figure 1 which 
suggest that ASDA and  Sainsbury appear to follow virtually identical trends. Why prices 
in the second largest retailer would be unimportant in explaining price trends of the Big 
Four is not clear, and difficult to justify economically. This apparent inconsistency can be 
reconciled if we allow for two cointegrating relations among the four prices each 
containing a triplet (i.e. J:A:T and S:A:T).  
 
 
                                                 
8 Inclusion of a unrestricted trend would allow for quadratic trends in the series expressed in level. 
9 The same conclusion is reached using the benchmark model with unrestricted constant although owing to the 
reduction in parameters of the restricted constant model, test statistics are stronger.   10 
Table 2: VAR(p) Model Selection Criteria (unrestricted constant, restricted trend) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Lag length   System Reduction
† Vector Autocorrelation
††    Information Criteria 
  (p)  [prob values]  [prob values]  SBC  HQC  AIC 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 5  …  0.76  8.33  7.43  6.81 
 4  0.21  0.70  7.99  7.25  6.74 
 3  0.42  0.68  7.61  7.03  6.64 
 2  0.03  0.00  7.38  6.97  6.69 
 1  0.02  0.18  7.06  6.81  6.64 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
†System reduction statistics are probability values of an F statistic evaluating the significance of the intervening 
lags in increasingly parsimonious compared to the VAR(5).  
††Autocorrelation statistics are probability values 
of vector-based F statistics for serial correlation.  See Doornik and Hendry (2001) for details. 
 
Evidence for such relations is provided by the residuals of the cointegrating vectors which 
show no sign of the non-stationarity present in the price series themselves (Figure 2).  Of 
course, the presence of cointegrating triplets of prices among the four prices implies that 
A:S form a cointegrating pair and all of which are confirmed at the 5% significance levels in 
separate testing.
10 When a second cointegrating vector is allowed for in the model, the long 
run variable exclusion tests now lend support for the notion that Sainsbury does form part 
of the (more complex) long run story (albeit at the 12% level).   Proceeding on that basis 
we now test for price leadership.
11
 
Table 3: Cointegration Analysis of VAR(3) (restricted constant and restricted trend) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Ordered eigenvalues 
  0.16256     0.083884         0.053681        0.037367    
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Cointegration Test Statistics 
rank   Trace test     Max test     Trace test      Max test 
   (Asymptotic)  (Asymptotic) (Finite  Sample)
† (Finite  Sample)
†
  0        68.79 [0.017]       34.06 [0.025]        64.49 [0.042]       31.93 [0.049]  
   1        34.73 [0.260]        16.82 [0.488]         32.56 [0.365]        15.77 [0.578]   
   2        17.91 [0.358]        10.59 [0.566]         16.79 [0.439]         9.93 [0.634]   
   3         7.31 [0.323]         7.31 [0.323]          6.85 [0.370]         6.85 [0.371]   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Exclusion Tests 
One Cointegrating Vector  Two Cointegrating Vectors 
ASDA   =   7.3413   [0.0067]  ASDA   =   10.342   [0.0057]  ) 1 (
2 χ ) 2 (
2 χ
Sainsbury   =  0.28681 [0.5923]  Sainsbury   =  4.1179 [0.1276]  ) 1 (
2 χ ) 2 (
2 χ
Safeway  =   14.484   [0.0001]  Safeway  =   20.137  [0.0000]  ) 1 (
2 χ ) 2 (
2 χ
Tesco  =   6.9532   [0.0084]  Tesco  =   7.2905   [0.0261]    ) 1 (
2 χ ) 2 (
2 χ
___________________________________________________________________________ 
† Finite sample corrections to the asymptotic test statistics for cointegration are those of Cheng and Lai (1993)  
 
                                                 
10 In the interest of space, these details are not reported, but are available upon request.  
11 Conclusions regarding tactical and strategic price leadership are unchanged if one cointegrating vector is 
assumed. We proceed with two simply because there seems little sense in maintaining that only one 
cointegrating vector exists.   11 
Figure 2: Residuals from Cointegrating Relations 














Inference on Tactical Price Leadership 
As set out in the previous section Granger-causality test are used to test for tactical price 
leadership.  This involves testing a series of zero-restrictions on lagged price changes in the 
VECM, the results of which are summarised in Table 4. Each row represents an equation 
in the VECM (i.e. dependant variable is expressed in changes).  Each cell entry in plain text 
represents the probability value of an F statistic testing the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the price changes in the column-heading supermarket are jointly zero for 
the row-heading supermarket. So for example, in the ASDA equation an F test of the joint 
significance of the lagged changes in the Sainsbury price (at t-1 and t-2) has a p-value of 0.28 
implying the Sainsbury prices are not jointly significant at the 10% level in the Asda 
equation.   The test of lagged changes in Tesco prices in the ASDA equation yields a 
probability value of 0.11; on the Safeway coefficients a p-value of 0.88.  These results 
indicate that lagged Tesco prices are borderline significant at the 10% level in the ASDA 
equation and that the prices of Sainsbury and Safeway are not.  
 
Table 4: Tactical Price Leadership 
 
Equation ∆xt H0: Coefficients on ∆xt-1 and ∆xt-2 = 0 
 Asda  Sainsbury  Tesco  Safeway   
Asda ---  0.28  0.11  0.88  0.26 
Sainsbury 0.63 ---  0.88  0.76  0.96 
Tesco 0.85  0.40  ---  0.84  0.86 
Safeway 0.06  0.50 0.09  --- 0.03 
  0.36  0.52  0.11  0.97  
  Figures are probability values for Granger Non-causality Tests conducted in the VECM 
 
 
Reviewing the results of this test in the other equations we can see that Asda prices are 
Granger Causal for Safeway, Tesco prices are Granger-causal for Asda and Safeway and  12 
that Sainsbury and Safeway prices are not Granger-Casual for any prices. In other words, 
no price is Granger Causal for all others. This does not however imply that there is not a 
tactical price leader in the market. As we have noted, to require a tactical price leader to be 
Granger-Causal for all rivals seems overly rigorous since the presence of a independent 
(tactical) pricer somewhere in the market (which is the role played by Sainsbury here) 
would rule out the possibility of (tactical) price leadership. Defining the tactical price 
leader as we have done in Section 4 requires that the price simply leads the market (rather 
than all rivals in the market). In terms of the statistical testing where we find a competitor 
whose lagged prices are jointly significant in the other equations we have a candidate for 
(tactical) price leadership providing that the lagged prices of  its competitors are not 
significant in its equation. Figures in bold and the bottom of each column and at the end of 
each row in Table 4 represent p-values from such tests. The null that lagged Tesco prices do 
not affect competitors is rejected at the 11% level. Conversely, the null that lagged 
competitor prices do not affect Tesco has a p-value of 0.86 (entailing the prices of 
competitors are unimportant to the short run determination of Tesco’s prices). On this 
basis Tesco is the tactical price leader in the market.
12   
 
Inference on Strategic Price Leadership 
Given that the VECM contains information regarding the long run evolution of prices we 
can test whether any of the prices are responsible for this trending behaviour or merely 
respond to it. A price that is exogenous to the long run relationship of which it is part does 
not (by definition) adjust to maintain the equilibrium. In this sense, it drives the 
relationship rather than being driven by it. Since the error correction coefficients measure 
the rate of the adjustment to the long run relationship, strategic price leadership can be 
inferred from the statistical significance of these coefficients, so called (long run) weak 
exogeneity tests. Table 5 reproduces the error correction coefficients from each equation in 
the VECM (see appendix) along with their corresponding p-values.   As can be seen Asda 
appears to correct for deviations in both equilibrium relations; Sainsbury and Safeway 
correct for one (the one in which they appear) and Tesco corrects to neither. This pattern 
suggests that Tesco is the strategic price leader and a formal test of this hypothesis evaluates 
the joint significance of both error correction coefficients. The resulting p-values from this 
χ
2(2) test of weak exogeneity are also given in the table and confirm that Tesco is indeed 
the strategic price leader.  
 
Table 5: Strategic Price Leadership 
  Error Correction Coefficients     

























                                                 
12 Note also that the p-values relate to F tests of the joint significance of coefficients for price changes at t-1 and 
t-2, and thus where one is significant and the other not, joint significance will tend to diluted. For this reason, it 
seems sensible to infer significance at the 10% level rather than the more usual 5%.  13 
VI.   Conclusion 
This paper contains the results of a preliminary statistical analysis of price leadership 
among the ‘Big Four’ supermarket chains in the UK during a three year and half year 
period in the recent past. The data used for this purpose represent weekly price indices of a 
common basket of products covering 36 categories sold in ASDA, Safeway, and Tesco. 
Being based on such a wide range of products the result complement previous product 
specific analyses undertaken by the Competition Commission. Adopting vector 
autoregressive methods offers a number of potential advantages to the investigation of 
price leadership, not least of which is that it gives the opportunity to investigate a number 
of prices as a system rather than in pairs. The paper also introduces the concepts of tactical 
and strategic price leadership which relate to the pricing behaviour observed over the short 
and long run. Although the results are preliminary they point to the presence of a price 
leader in both the tactical and strategic senses. This turns out to be Tesco, the largest 
supermarket chain in the UK, which was also identified as a price leader (albeit with 
ASDA) by the Competition Commission as part of their 2000 Supermarket Inquiry.  
 
Some caveats are however in order at this point. First, as a preliminary analysis of the data, 
further statistical testing is required to evaluate the robustness of the results obtained. 
While VARs offer many advantages in analyses of this kind, results they produce are 
known to be model dependent in empirical applications, owing in large part to the 
inherent over-parameterisation of the VAR. Although the sample size is relatively large 
here, caution is nevertheless warranted in the absence of a thorough sensitivity analysis. 
Second, results relate to a specific period of time and common basket of products and thus 
should not be extrapolated. Finally, although the results point to a pattern of pricing that is 
suggestive of collusive anti-competitive behaviour the results do not deny the possibility 
that the price leadership is barometric in nature, and thus benign. In addition to further 
statistical testing of the empirical model, the methodology requires formalisation both in 
terms of notions of tactical and strategic leadership and the issue of asymmetric price 
leadership. These are subjects of on-going research.  
   14 
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Appendix: Categories and Indicators 
 
1. BREAD  Large white loaves (sliced and unsliced), small brown 
loaf, large wholemeal loaf, bread rolls, pitta bread and 
french stick/baguette 
2. CEREALS   Flour, rice, pasta, selected breakfast cereals and cereal 
snacks 
3. BISCUITS & CAKES   Various  biscuits (eg plain and chocolate-coated), 
crackers and cakes (eg fruit pies, sponge cakes, 
doughnuts and scones) 
4. BEEF   Specified cuts: rump steak, braising steak, mince and 
topside, and beefburgers 
5. LAMB   Specified cuts: loin chops and shoulder, specified cuts: 
loin chops and leg 
6. PORK   Specified cuts: loin chops and shoulder 
7. BACON   Gammon and back rashers 
8. POULTRY   Fresh/chilled  and  frozen whole chicken and chicken 
pieces, frozen turkey and cooked sliced turkey 
9. OTHER MEAT   Pork sausages, various cooked and canned meats, and 
various meat pies 
10. FRESH FISH   White fish and salmon fillets 
11. PROCESSED FISH   Canned tuna, fish fingers and various frozen fish and 
prawns 
12. BUTTER   Home-produced and imported butter 
13. OILS & FATS   Margarine/low fat spread and cooking oil 
14. CHEESE   Cheddar  (home-produced and imported), selected 
speciality cheese and cheese spread and slices 
15. EGGS   Various sized eggs 
16. MILK   Various quantities of full-fat, semi-skimmed, skimmed, 
and flavoured milk 
17.  MILK  PRODUCTS    Yoghurt, fresh cream, powdered baby formula, 
fromage frais and chilled pot dessert 
18. TEA   Tea bags and herbal/fruit tea bags 
19. SOFT DRINKS   Various  pure  fruit juices, squashes, lemonade, cola, 
energy drinks, other fizzy drinks and mineral water 
20. SUGAR & PRESERVES   Sugar and various jams 
21. SWEETS & CHOCOLATES   Various selected popular brands of sweets, chocolates 
and mints 
22. UNPROCESSED POTATOES   White loose and pre-packed potatoes (old and new 
varieties) 
23. PROCESSED POTATOES   Crisps (single and multi-packs), potato flavoured snacks 
and frozen chips 
24.  FRESH  VEGETABLES    Fresh tomatoes, cabbages, cauliflowers, carrots, 
sprouts, onions, mushrooms, cucumbers, lettuce, 
organic vegetable and pre-packed salads 
25. PROCESSED VEGETABLES  Canned  tomatoes, baked beans and sweet corn, and 
frozen peas 
26.  FRESH  FRUIT    Cooking and dessert apples, pears, bananas, 
strawberries, grapes, oranges, grapefruit, avocado pears, 
peaches, organic fruit and kiwi fruit 
27. PROCESSED FRUIT   Various canned fruits and salted peanuts  16 
28.  OTHER  FOODS    Ice cream, selected frozen and chilled convenience 
foods, canned and packet foods (eg soups, spaghetti, 
and pasta shapes), baby food, various sauces and pickles 
29. COFFEE & HOT DRINKS   Ground and instant coffees, and hot milk drink 
30. BEER “OFF” SALES   Canned  brown  ale, lager and draught flow bitter, 
bottled cider, and lager 
31. WINES & SPIRITS “OFF”   Whisky, vodka, gin, brandy, sherry, various white and 
red wines and spirit based drink 
32. TOBACCO & CIGARETTES  Selected brands 
33. OTHER TOBACCO   Selected brands of cigarettes, and cigars 
34. HOUSEHOLD ITEMS   Washing  powder and liquid, washing-up liquid and 
dish washer powder, stationery (pens, writing paper, 
envelopes, greeting cards, printer paper and clear sticky 
tape), battery, light bulbs, aluminum foil, toilet paper, 
bin liners, household cream cleaner, cleaning cloths 
and air freshener spray 
35. PET CARE   Canned dog and cat food, dry cat food, dog mixer, cat 
litter. 
36. CHEMISTS’ GOODS   Selected medicines and surgical goods (eg contact lens 
solution, indigestion tablets and pain killer tablets), 
multi-vitamins, condoms, tampons, disposable nappies, 
toiletries (eg toilet soap, toothpaste, deodorants, 
shampoo, permanent hair colourant, disposable razors 
and sunscreen cream/ lotion), various cosmetics (eg lip 
stick, face cream, perfume and mascara), tissues and 
plasters 
 
Source: Office of National Statistics 
  17 
Appendix: Vector Error Correction Model of Prices 
 
The estimation sample is: 1999 (4) to 2002 (39) 
URF equation for: Dasda 
                 Coefficient  Std.Error       HCSE   t-HCSE  t-prob 
Dasda_1             0.162330    0.07382    0.08146     1.99   0.048 
Dasda_2            -0.177483    0.07199    0.07449    -2.38   0.018 
DTesco_1          -0.0476210    0.04702    0.04652    -1.02   0.307 
DTesco_2           0.0839098    0.04779    0.05244     1.60   0.111 
DJS_1             -0.0550781    0.05099    0.05048    -1.09   0.277 
DJS_2              0.0480305    0.05126    0.05217    0.921   0.358 
DSafeway_1       -0.00513662    0.02821    0.04185   -0.123   0.902 
DSafeway_2        -0.0124414    0.02752    0.02339   -0.532   0.595 
CIV1_3            -0.0572444    0.01528    0.01790    -3.20   0.002 
CIV2_3            -0.0376929    0.02421    0.02169    -1.74   0.084 
 
URF equation for: DTesco 
                 Coefficient  Std.Error       HCSE   t-HCSE  t-prob 
Dasda_1            0.0616970     0.1153     0.1059    0.583   0.561 
Dasd2_2           0.00692936     0.1124     0.1027   0.0675   0.946 
DTesco_1          -0.0347999    0.07344    0.08210   -0.424   0.672 
DTesco_2           -0.235641    0.07464    0.09252    -2.55   0.012 
DJS_1             0.00934250    0.07964    0.07843    0.119   0.905 
DJS_2               0.104846    0.08006    0.07530     1.39   0.166 
DSafeway_1      -0.000716369    0.04406    0.04327  -0.0166   0.987 
DSafeway_2        -0.0247878    0.04297    0.03355   -0.739   0.461 
CIV1_3           -0.00601945    0.02387    0.02095   -0.287   0.774 
CIV2_3             0.0451706    0.03781    0.03883     1.16   0.246 
 
 
URF equation for: DJS 
                 Coefficient  Std.Error       HCSE   t-HCSE  t-prob 
Dasda_1            0.0965708     0.1073     0.1068    0.905   0.367 
Dasda_2           -0.0369394     0.1046     0.1032   -0.358   0.721 
DTesco_1           0.0278943    0.06834    0.06564    0.425   0.671 
DTesco_2           0.0197789    0.06946    0.06741    0.293   0.770 
DJS_1              -0.201550    0.07411    0.06506    -3.10   0.002 
DJS_2              -0.306253    0.07451    0.08803    -3.48   0.001 
DSafeway_1        -0.0196969    0.04101    0.04673   -0.421   0.674 
DSafeway_2         0.0217958    0.03999    0.03848    0.566   0.572 
CIV1_3            -0.0312853    0.02221    0.02555    -1.22   0.222 
CIV2_3             0.0899514    0.03518    0.03414     2.64   0.009 
 
URF equation for: DSafeway 
                 Coefficient  Std.Error       HCSE   t-HCSE  t-prob 
Dasda_1             0.268598     0.1960     0.1556     1.73   0.086 
Dasda_2             0.329374     0.1911     0.1567     2.10   0.037 
DTesco_1            0.270217     0.1248     0.1258     2.15   0.033 
DTesco_2           0.0112110     0.1269     0.1006    0.111   0.911 
DJS_1              0.0959741     0.1354     0.1301    0.738   0.462 
DJS_2               0.137233     0.1361     0.1355     1.01   0.313 
DSafeway_1      -0.000547470    0.07490    0.06040 -0.00906   0.993 
DSafeway_2         -0.174689    0.07304    0.06892    -2.53   0.012 
CIV1_3              0.153624    0.04057    0.04797     3.20   0.002 
CIV2_3            -0.0627189    0.06426    0.06940   -0.904   0.367 
 
R^2(LR)              0.443817  R^2(LM)              0.133364 
no. of observations       192  no. of parameters          40 
 
F-test on regressors except unrestricted: F(40,680) = 2.84703 [0.0000] ** 
F-tests on retained regressors, F(4,179) = 
    Dasda_1       1.50872 [0.202]      Dasda_2       2.58020 [0.039]*  
   DTesco_1       1.79744 [0.131]     DTesco_2       3.69225 [0.006]** 
      DJS_1       2.19832 [0.071]        DJS_2       6.14614 [0.000]** 
 DSafeway_1     0.0602408 [0.993]   DSafeway_2       1.58185 [0.181]   
     CIV1_3       8.28939 [0.000]**     CIV2_3       3.20604 [0.014]*  
 
correlation of URF residuals (standard deviations on diagonal) 
                    Dasda      DTesco         DJS    DSafeway 
Dasda             0.34706      0.12877      0.21681      0.14230 
DTesco            0.12877      0.54202      0.19171      0.13651 
DJS               0.21681      0.19171      0.50442     0.068292 
DSafeway          0.14230      0.13651     0.068292      0.92131 
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correlation between actual and fitted 
       Dasda      DTesco        DJS          DSafeway 
      0.41483      0.27114      0.35139      0.36434 
 
Testing for Vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 1 
 Chi^2(16)=   12.909 [0.6794]   and F-form F(16,535)=  0.75953 [0.7320]   
 
Vector Normality test for residuals:   Chi^2(8) =   57.572 [0.0000]** 
 
Testing for Vector heteroscedasticity using squares 
 Chi^2(200)=   203.29 [0.4219]   and F-form F(200,1388)=  0.96268 [0.6282]   
 
Testing for Vector heteroscedasticity using squares and cross products 
 Chi^2(650)=   640.16 [0.6009]   and F-form F(650,1090)=  0.94054 [0.8068]   
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